DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

 HEADQUARTERS, 44TH MEDICAL BRIGADE

 APO NEW YORK 09657

AFVH-XA-CO 6 December 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Academy of Health Sciences, ATTN: LTC Vervack, AMEDD Lessons Learned, Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234-5000

SUBJECT:  After Action Review, Operation Desert Shield, C+90

1. The following significant issues surfaced during the first 90 days of Operation Desert Shield which have not previously been forwarded.

2. The After Action Review will be broken down and distributed to the appropriate agencies (DA, FORSCOM, Office of the Surgeon General and XVIII Airborne Corps) for action.

JEROME V.  F 0 U S T

COL, MS

Commanding

AFTER ACTION REVIEW

I.    DEPLOYMENT/ ARRIVAL           

a.        Preparing to Load the Boat

b.       Loading the Boat

c.       Liaison Teams

d.       Command and Control

e.        Unit Arrivals

f.         AACG & ALCE OPS

g.       Arriving to Destination

h.       Reception or Vehicles at Port

i.         AOR Orientation

j.         Inadequate Theater Information

k.        Site Selection

l.         CSS Support for Non-Divisional Units

m.       Pre-Positioned Vehicles and Equipment

II. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

a.        Critical PROFIS Positions

b.       MILPO Data Base

c.        PROFIS Team Building

d.       TOY Orders for PROFIS 

e.        PROFIS Pt1 Officer 

f.         Unit Top Heavy With NCOs

g.       Organic Vet Assets

h.        MRO /

i.         MRO

j.         MRO

k.        Inadequate Forms Management

l.         Mail

III.   LOGISTICS

a.        Prevailing Bureaucracy

b.       Forklifts

c.        Barrier Material

d.       Shipping Containers

e.        Basic loads

f.         Stockage level of CPOGs

g.       Lack of Secure and Temperature Controlled Storage

h.       Desert Effects on Dental ~1aterial

i.         Infrastructure or Engineer Support

j.         Lack of Clear Guidance on Obtaining DCU’s

k.        Transportation Priority

l.         Transportation Organic

m.      Lack of Fuel Hauling

n.       Distribution Assets

o.      IPBO Property

p.      Class IX Repair Parts

 


AFTER ACTION REVIEW (CONT)

IV.  MTOE CHANGES

a.        Insufficient MTOE for 74th Med Det

b.       Senior Food Inspection Technician for 483rd

c.        Organization of Dental Treatment Teams

d.       Staff Positions

e.        Veterinary MTOE for JA and JB Teams

f.         No Computer Authorized for Veterinary MTOE

g.       Shortage of Fuel Handlers

h.       Bulk Fuel and Water Storage

i.         Materials Handling Equipment

j.         Required TO&E Strength for MRO

k.        MTOE Modifications

v.    SECURITY

a.        Medical Units do not Have Sufficient Personnel for Security

b.       Brigade Headquarters Guard Force

VI.  GENERAL

a.        No Communications Plan for MEDEVAC

b.        Strategic Aero-Medical Evacuation

c.        Soldier Care

d.       MEDSOM Quality Control

e.        Sick Call Mission

f.         Return to Duty

g.        Contamination Detection

h.       Area Support

i.         Blood System

j.         Toilets on Wards

k.        Poor Signal Communication With L Team Elements

l.         Joint Medical Regulating System

m.      Unforseen Demands for Supplies/Stocks

n.       Reporting Requirement for AOR


DEPLOYMENT/ARRIVAL

ISSUE:    Preparing to Load the Boat

DISCUSSION: Logmars produced and delivered late (after vehicle at port). Port officials put logmars on our equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: Have logmars pre-printed and on hand of immediate use on deployment. .

ACTION: Corps


DEPLOYMENT/ARRIVAL

ISSUE:  Loading the Boat

DISCUSSION:  No accurate information on what went on what boat

RECOMMENDATION:  Full time Brigade representative at the port to monitor equipment load status.

ACTION:  Corps - MTMC


DEPLOYMENT/ARRIVAL

ISSUE:  Liaison Teams

DISCUSSION:  Command and Control liaison teams are required early in the deployment to remain abreast of the concept of the operation and changing support requirements. Additionally, they will assist in support planning, preparing units locations and passing requirements to subordinate units prior to their deployment.

REMCOMMENDATION:  Headquarters units deploy a liaison team to the theater early to enhance-planning and deployment of subordinate units.

ACTION: Corps


DEPLOYMENT/ARRIVAL

ISSUE:  Command and Control

DISCUSSION:  The medical group and battalions were brought into theater at approximately the same time of following their subordinate units. This didn’t allow them the time to assist and properly prepare to receive their units, resulting in delays in the deployment to their tactical location.

RECOMMENDATION : Headquarters units be brought into theater early in the flow to allow them the opportunity to prepare for the receipt of their units.

ACTION:  FORSCOM


DEPLOYMENT/ ARRIVAL

ISSUE: Unit Arrivals

DISCUSSION:  Subordinate unit arrival dates should be evenly spread over time. The existing time phased force deployment list placed four TOE hospitals in country within one week. Neither the Medical Brigade nor the area support units are capable of providing necessary support (transportation -billeting) to properly accept four units at once. This problem is compounded, when high priority is given to combat-units. Medical personnel were forced into substandard living conditions and equipment was subjected to excessive and abusive handling as a result of poor phasing. There have been

many very slow weeks since initial deployment that no major units were scheduled for arrival.

RECOMMENDATION:  Improve management of the TPFDL

ACTION:  FORSCOM


DEPLOYMENT/ARRIVAL

ISSUE:  AACG & ALCE OPS

DISCUSSION:  ALCE could not provide info on incoming aircraft even when given mission numbers. AACG had no control on inbound cargo. Units literally have to hunt for cargo.

RECOMMENDATION :  Get control of AACG/ALCE. Establish standards and control on inbound cargo. Use locator system and accountability procedures.

ACTION:  ACofS. Logistics and COSCOM


DEPLOYMENT/ARRIVAL

ISSUE:  Arriving to Destination {Saudi Arabia)

DISCUSSION: No one to meet soldiers

RECOMMENDATION :  Have assigned Brigade liaison at air field to notify units coordinate transportation and be available to aide new arrivals.

ACTION:  ACofS, SPO


DEPLOYMENT/ ARRIVAL

ISSUE:  Reception of Vehicles at Port

DISCUSSION:  Equipment arriving at port is marshaled into a common area broken down only by type of equipment (rolling stock, milvans, etc...). There is apparently no control over the equipment and theoretically, any unit could drive away with any piece of equipment regardless of who actually owns it.

RECOMMENDATION : MSC’s place a representative at the port who maintains a register of equipment by unit, bumper number, and location in the marshalling area. Units will then submit signature cards to the representative and will sign for their equipment when they pick it up.

ACTION:  ACofS, LOG


DEPLOYMENT/ARRIVAL

ISSUE:  AOR Orientation

DISCUSSION:  Briefings by Middle East expert and commo with deployed element were inadequate for providing info to main body personnel regarding AOR.

RECOMMENDATON : Deploying units should receive AOR orientation prior to deployment.

ACTION: Corps


DEPLOYMENT/ARRIVAL

ISSUE:  Inadequate Theater Info

DISCUSSION: Inadequate information to later deploying units on local requirements discovered by ADVON/CORPS, etc. E.G. civilian clothes for contracting agents. Requirements to buy off local economy, etc.

RECOMMENDATION: Higher HQs ADVOr~ should develop practical info packages containing requirements, conditions and issues to pass to rear for later deploying units

ACTION: Corps


DEPLOYMENT/ARRIVAL

ISSUE: Site Selection

DISCUSSION:  The location of the 47th Field Hospital at Shaikh-Isa Air Base in Bahrain was an accident of geography rather than a coordinated part of a cohesive medical support plan. The 47th Field Hospital was selected as an early deploying unit, primarily because there was a pre-positioned set of Field Hospital equipment in the theater. The unit was sent to Bahrain because that is where the warehouse with the pre-positioned stocks was located. The unit located to Shaikh-Isa Air Base because the Bahrain government asked that all US forces be centrally located at the remote air base site. None of the decisions on the location had anything to do with the Commanders intent to provide medical support to the theater. Subsequent problems developed in evacuation plans, i.e., there was no way to regulate patients by air through Bahrain airspace from Saudi Arabia. Problems also surfaced among Marine and Air Force Fighter Commanders in that they expressed concern about MEDEVAC transport operations on Shaikh-Isa Air Base.

RECOMMENDATION: Unit locations should be determined by the Commanders intent consistent with the tactical plans.

ACTION: FORSCOM


DEPLOYMENT /ARRIVAL

ISSUE: CSS Support for Non-divisional Units

DISCUSSION: The doctrinal area support concept for non-divisional units works only if there are other Army non-divisional units in the  area. Current Army Doctrine calls for non-divisional CSS units to be organized functionally and to draw non- organic CSS from other Army CSS units located in the same general vicinity. The 47th Field Hospital was the only US Army unit deployed to Bahrain and therefore there were no other CSS units to draw supply and service, maintenance, fuel, laundry and bath personnel and finance support.

RECOMMENDATION : Always deploy functional CSS units to mutually supporting AOR or organize the units multi-functionally so that they are self sustaining entities.

ACTION: FORSCOM


PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: Critical PROFIS Positions

DISCUSSION: PROFIS Specialists not idenitified early. PROFIS Commanders not board selected. not PCC qualified. not trained for mission. Corps level ‘specialists not intergrated into unit training.

RECOMMENDATION: Select key PROFIS fillers (CDRs, Corps PM, Corps Vet, etc). School them for mission (Pre-Command course, C&GSC, etc). Annual training with unit.

ACTION:  OTSG/HSC


PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: MILPO Data for PROFIS Fillers

DISCUSSION: PROFIS fillers from off-post units arrived without personnel info. MILPO and SIDPERS data could not be updated. This effects OER’s, zones of eligibility, etc.

RECOMt1ENDATION: Provide PROFIS info sheets to gaining commands, full ORB, DA Form 2 and 2-1. Each service member could bring a floppy disk to load. should be PROFIS regulatory requirement.

ACTION: ACofS, P&A/OTSG


PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: PROFIS Team Building

DISCUSSION: Effectiveness of large organizations is increased by teamwork. Deployment added new player (PROFIS, Personnel plus-ups).

RECOMMENDATIONS: Train with designated PROFIS at least annually. Develop “’Buddy System” (organic member -new member). Maintain continuity of existing teams from MEDDAC’s when possible. Deve10p mental approach toward TEAM.

ACTION: Letter to HSC/AHS-CofS


PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: TDY Orders for PROFIS

DISCUSSION: PROFIS officers and enlisted personnel were arriving on a variety of TDY orders with varying fund cites. Some were for travel only and others were for the full 179 days. MILPO’s were unsure whether to attach or assign these personnel to the unit. As a result, some personnel experienced temporary housing, lodging and financial problems, It was unclear to the units sending personnel as to the length of time and the fund cite that should be on the TDY orders. With the find cite code in question, officers and soldiers were moved again and again to ensure that they would not be held financially accountable when it was not their fault. Units were called in an effort to extend TDY orders. Coordination to either assign or attach personnel was further complicated by the lack of available temporary housing and lodging to accommodate the number of personnel.

RECOMMENDATION :  Before individuals are deployed, a message needs to come out from Department of the Army level describing how TDY orders should read, that is, the number of days and the correct fund cite in order to get the personnel to the deploying unit site. Then, local MILPO’s should either attach/assign or leave those personnel on TDY status until adequate housing/lodging is available

ACTION: HSC

.


PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: PROFIS PM Officer

DISCUSSION: The above slot should have been filled earlier than C+69. There was no staff Preventive Medicine (PM) physician above division level until that time. One result was that each newly arriving division. or corps unit did not have the benefit of preventive medicine lessons learned by divisions which preceded it. There was no integrating pm representation at the Corps level to help minimize the following situations which occurred:

               Major outbreaks of diarrhea and dysentery plagued every large unit after arrival. Soldier readiness in this fast maturing theater was impaired and medical treatment assets consumed unexpectedly large amounts of medical supplies and drugs. to the point of depletion.

               No coherent, Corps-wide policies were developed nor were actions taken to reduce the risks of such illness for newly arriving units.

               High-level medical participation was absent from the contracting process, which resulted in the construction of thousands of out- door latrines with major design flaws. The use of these sub- standard latrines worsened overall sanitation and provided fertile breeding grounds for flies.

               Medical (PM) input was absent from site selection for, and preparation of, troop staging areas in the Corps rear. The overcrowded, unsanitary encampments were associated with disease outbreaks and terrible morale. Late arriving PM detachments were hard pressed to overcome deplorable camp conditions and had no representation at Corps level to focus command attention of these issues.

               The deployment of Corps PM detachments greatly antedated the arrival of the PM officer at the Corps level medical brigade.

               Corps-wide, centralized planning for immunizations (immune serum globulin and influenza vaccine) was greatly deployed.

The PROFIS system should have provided an appropriate fill, early in the operation, for the PM position in the 44th t1edical Brigade. It did not.

RECOMMENDATION: Health Service Command (HSC) fix the PROFIS system. Fillers should be handpicked for slots (HSC) and practice readiness exercises should be staged (FORSCOM) to ensure both the individual filler and the gaining units are adequately prepared for mobilization and deployment.

ACTION: HSC


PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: MRO

DISCUSSION: Of those 716 MOS personnel assigned to the Brigade headquarters, or those borrowed from other Brigade units, none are adequately trained for the Brigade MRO mission.

RECOMMENDATION: A garrison training plan must be established for assigned 71G MOS personnel to include participation in a hospital based program, and a hospital exported training program to the Brigade.

ACTION: HSC
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: MRO

DISCUSSION: A patient administration officer, 67E, in at least the grade of 0-3, must be permanently assigned to the Brigade headquarters.  This position is vital to establishing MRO procedures,. training programs for 7IG MOS personnel, and exercising these In both a garrison and field setting.

RECOMMENDATION: OTSG/Officer assignments/Brigade coordination

ACTION:  OTSG


PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: Unit Top Heavy with NCOs

DISCUSSION: This unit (483rd Med Det (VS)(JB)), was organized and pieced together by 7th MEDCOM with the idea that fill personnel would be selected up to two grades above the required MTOE rank structure for each position. The original reason for this decision was to insure plenty of experience and expertise within the unit. However the decision resulted in a unit, which was Top heavy in NCOs. Unit cohesion was hurt because of the conflicts between the NCOs. Unit morale was hurt because NCOs were required to perform menial details and duties due to a lack of lower enlisted personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: That any future unit sent to this theater be made up of excellent, competent senior NCOs, with an adequate number of lower enlisted personnel to perform the work, to include the menial details and duties.

ACTION: HSC


PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: Organic Veterinary Assets

DISCUSSION: Currently the 44th Medical Brigade has an organic 6 man veterinary service JA team, 248th Med Det (1 officer, four food inspection specialist and one animal care specialist). By doctrine, FM,8-27 Veterinary Service, this JA team is designed to support 20,000 personnel or one/two divisions. Once the XVIII Airborne Corps is fully deployed (100,000 personnel) there are inadequate veterinary assets organic or identified to support the Corps operation. For this exercise, a veterinary service JB team, 483rd Med Det was deployed from Europe. No prior notice was given. Since this was an ALO 7 unit, numerous assets and personnel were taken from other veterinary units within Europe. This resulted in a loss of unit identity and initially created command and control problems.

RECOMMENDATION: Identify a veterinary service JB team to support the XVIII Airborne Corps when it is fully deployed. Ensure that this deployment is considered in operational plans at the Corps G-3. Exercises involving Division units or less, the 248th Med Det (JA) of the 73rd Med Det (JA) would be adequate to provide veterinary support.

ACTION: FORSCOM; Force Development


PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: MRO

DISCUSSION:  A TOE position for a 67H MOS officer to act as a ~1RO is filled, but the officer is working elsewhere. 7IG MOS personnel are being used in positions outside their MOS position.

RECOMOENDATION: “Either re-align existing personnel into their valid TOE position and/or duty, or where valid vacancies exist, submit personnel replacement requisitions.

ACTION: HSC/OTSG


PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ISSUE: Inadequate Forms Management

DISCUSSION: Prior to deployment, the units assembled and loaded quantities and types of forms, based primarily on historical experience of unit personnel. It quickly became apparent that the quantities brought were insufficient in many cases, and in other cases, required forms had been omitted. There is n~ system in place for the distribution and re-supply of blank forms.

RECOMMENDATION: Corps should establish a Forms Supply Point, pre-packed in milvans for shipment to theatre. The responsible element must solicit Health Care providers, as well as administrative areas, to provide a listing of forms required, and estimates of the number required to support a 30 day operation. These forms should be shipped with the unit if at all possible, and coordination for re-supply.

ACTION: Corps


PERSONNEL AND ADMINSTRATION

ISSUE: Mail

DISCUSSION: The arrival of mail was non-existent for the first two weeks on the ground in Saudi Arabia. By the third week, 20-30% of the total mail was arriving” Many officers and soldiers have only received 1 piece of mail in over 3 weeks, There appears to have been no contingency to support such a demand for mail in this theater to all US troops in the gulf area. The arrival of mail is a definite morale issue and warrants a concerted effort to ensure a workable system.

RECOMMENDATION:  master contingency plan be established for future deployment areas. This plan must be developed early in the planning process prior to the deployment of any soldiers if reasonably possible. Definite consideration needs to be given to host nation support and proper staffing levels to ensure realistic success for timely delivery of mail.

ACTION: DA/FORSCOM LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Prevailing Bureaucracy

DISCUSSION: Processing general supply/service request for standard items and local purchase items has become a bureaucratic nightmare. Requests must be ‘hand carried to as many as eight different’ organizations prior, to acceptance by the source of supply. The distribution system is untimely and totally unreliable for relaying requests between organizations.

RECOMMENDATION: “Streamline” the system back to pre-exercise standards.

ACTION: Corps


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Forklifts

DISCUSSION: Hospital units require the use of a forklift on a daily basis for establishing the facility, down load of medical supplies and the maintenance and positioning of the U-PACs and environmental control units.

RECOMMENDATION: Forklifts be leased for the duration of the exercise and that MHE be added to the hospital TOEs.

ACTION: Corps/MMC


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Barrier Material

DISCUSSION: Combat Service Support units have low priority for barrier material in the theater. Supplies of sand bags and concertina wire are not adequate to build appropriate defenses

RECOMMENDATION: That combat service support units stockpile barrier material at home station and ship it in with the rest of the unit equipment.

ACTION: Corps, G-4


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Shipping Containers

DISCUSSION: The MEDSOMs were not authorized adequate M’ILVAN containers to ship their equipment. The 47th MEDSOM had only two MILVANs prior to deployment but required 12 to properly pack all organic equipment for shipment. Support was provided by 13th COSCOM through cross leveling.

RECOMMENDATION: Change MEDSOM authorization documents to reflect adequate number of MILVAN containers.

ACTION: Force Development, HSC


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Basic Loads

DISCUSSION:

RECOMMENDATION: Units must be given specific guidance on basic load amounts prior to deployment.

ACTION: Corps

LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Stockage Levels of CPOGs

DISCUSSION: Requisitions for extra CPOGs to accommodate patients were denied at G-4. Usually the only chemical protection item that a patient brings is a protective mask.

RECOMMENDATION: Authorize hospitals to maintain an extra stockage level of CPOGs at one per operating bed plus 20%.

ACTION: Corps/ACofS, LOG


LOGISTICS

ISSUE:  Lack of Secure Temperature Controlled Storage

DISCUSSION:  Obtaining field safes and larger refrigerators in which to store code Q, R items or bulk temperature sensitive pharmaceuticals has been an ongoing problem.

RECOMMENDATION:  Lockable security cabinets be devised and fielded.  Further, Field Hospitals (400 beds) will require large numbers of refrigerators in which to store vaccines, biological and certain other temperature sensitive pharmaceuticals.  Develop requirement documents for RD&A for deployment/procurement of appropriate securable field safes/refrigerators.

ACTION:  Corps


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Desert Effects on Dental Material

DISCUSSION: The heat of the desert makes providing dental care all but unworkable, as dental materials require controlled temperature. This is necessary for the general dentists, prosthodontist, prosthodontic laboratory.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that Temper Tents and air conditioning units be provided for the larger treatment sections of the Dental Company and Dental Detachment. (One-chair clinics can employ within hospitals and dispensaries).

ACTION: Combat Developers -AHS


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Infrastructure of Engineering Support

DISCUSSION: he only coordination that had been done on behalf of the 47th Field Hospital was that a MPR for $250,000.00 had been sent to Navy contracting at the Administrative Support Unit (ASU) Bahrain and hotel reservations were made for 45 rooms for 60 days. It was expected that the $250,000.00 MPR would allow the unit to contract for all supplies and services. Many of the supplies and services were unable to be contracted for immediately. This problem was exacerbated when the main body arrived less than 48 hours after the advance party. Engineering support to prepare the site for set up, food, fuel, water, latrine support, laundry, shower, and transportation all had to be arranged for from scratch with no logistical interface. It was strictly Commander to fellow US Commander or Bahrain Defense Force or Commander to the vendor transactions.

RECOMMENDATION: That a COSCOM logistics element be among the early departing units to at least set up the logistics framework and give briefings and advice to the Commanders. Alternatively, four or five person teams could have been dispatched by commercial transportation immediately upon unit notification to do logistics coordination.

ACTION: Corps


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Lack of Clear Guidance on Obtaining DCU’s

DISCUSSION: Since the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, the number of DCUs authorized per individual has been an item of concern and ambiguity. The original request submitted at Fort Bragg was reduced from three sets to two sets per individual. Since

arrival in-theater, the number authorized has been changed from two sets to four and back to two depending on the person spoken to in the logistics chain. To date, there remain individuals in this unit without their initial two-set issue, de- spite intense management.

RECOMMENDATION: A written policy from Corps G-4 expressing the number of CUs authorized and procedures required to obtain the uniforms upon their availability must be distributed as general distribution to the lowest level possible.

ACTION: Corps G-4


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Transportation Priority

DISCUSSION: Class VIII supplies, medical unit personnel, and equipment is not receiving a fair share of transportation assets. Medical unit personnel, equipment, and Class VIII supplies are denied transportation due to priority movement of Class I and Class V. This action results in increased order ship time of supplies to requesting units, delayed establishment of medical support, in- creased processing time, increased potential for deterioration and pilferage and denial of medical treatment.

RECOMMENDATION: Initiate action to obtain an equitable share of transportation assets for medical resources.

ACTION: COSCOM/MCC


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Transportation -Organic

DISCUSSION: Inadequate vehicular assets to perform mission.  Too low on priority to get Corps support in timely manner.

RECOMMENDA TI ON: Long Term -Seek higher priority from Corps. Term Short -Seek MTOE change/units provide input

ACTION: COSCOM MMC/Comba t Development -AHS


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Lack of Fuel Hauling/Distribution Assets

DISCUSSION: During the past few weeks the hospital has responded to several incidents involving problems with receiving Class III (b) fuel (JET-A-l). Doctrinally, fuel should be hauled to the hospital; however, because of the lack of adequate Army tanker/transportation assets in-theater, the mission .to haul fuel to the hospital was handed back to the hospital to resolve. Contracted fuel service continues to be interrupted frequently because of the incompatibility of host-nation and US equipment. Also, there are continual changes in the enforcement or standards at the fuel farm where refueling is accomplished. The number of personnel and equipment currently authorized by MTOE are not sufficient to support a 24-hour operation for an unlimited period of time.

RECOMMENDATION:

An increase in the authorized number of personnel (fuel handlers) will allow sufficient personnel rotations for picking up, hauling and handling the fuel requirements to support the 200 bed hospital. An alternative to an increase of personnel would be authorizing larger hauling and storage vehicles. An increase of this nature would reduce the number of times the fuel handlers would have to make trips to the bulk fuel point.

ACTION: Combat Developer/AHS/HSC


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: IPBO Property

DISCUSSION: Unit deployed without IPBO property

RECOMMENDATION: Include IPBO property on load plan.

ACTION: COSCOM G’-4


LOGISTICS

ISSUE: Class IX Repair Parts

DISCUSSION: Vehicles are dead lined due to the non availability of repair parts Standards items such as glow plugs, fuel filters and water pumps which are easily available normally can not be procured through the supply system. An inordinate amount of repair parts must be locally procured to keep vehicle running. Corps level repair part units and ASL were/are insufficient to support this theater.

RECOMMENDATION: The unit should deploy with additional PLL items based on the area of operation. Increase unit’s PLL on high demand items prior to deployment. Increase CSS ASL for high demand items.

ACTION: Corps, G-4


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUE: Insufficient MTOE for 74th Med Det

DISCUSSION: The MTOE did not meet current AM team mission requirements. Critical technical equipment including data processing equipment was not included in the MTOE. A mechanic (63B) was not provided to support the five authorized vehicles. MTOE restrictions delayed deployment preparations. Non-MTOE equipment items required to meet Operation Desert Shield mission requirements were allowed only after a special request by the Office of the Surgeon General. Prior to departure from CONUS, no information was provided by CENTCOM to facilitate preparations and ensure appropriate mission capability.

RECOMMENDATION: Review and revise the PROFIS listing as necessary to ensure its accuracy. Provide mission orientations/training to A~1 team members upon designation as PROFIS fillers. Place the 74th ~1edical Detachment directly under its parent unit, the 44th t.1edical Brigade, for mobilization; and relocate equipment storage to Fort Bragg, NC. Assign at least one officer against the 74th Medical Detachment MTOE and charge that officer with controlling and safeguarding Detachment equipment. Revise the MTOE to more accurately reflect current A~1 team mission requirements for equipment and personnel. Revise the deployment schedule so that, in future mobilizations, the AM team is fielded early in the operation; before, or simultaneously with, its subordinate elements.

ACTION: Combat Development/AHS


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUE:  Senior Food Inspector Technician for 483rd 

DISCUSSION: The JB team, Veterinary Service Large, is not currently authorized a Food Inspection Technician, warrant officer, ASI 640A. In fact there has been no change in the MTOE, recognizing the addition of the warrant officer to the Veterinary Corps, since their formation almost ten years ago. Many JB teams located in USAREUR have warrant officer assigned under their TDAs. The Food Inspection Technician is needed within the JB team to insure the presence of a food inspection subject matter expert to supervise and standardize the food inspection mission.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a warrant officer, ASI 640A, Food Inspection Technician, be authorized on the JB Team MTOE to assist the commander in

Organizing, supervising, and standardizing the food inspection mission.

ACTION:  AHS, TO&E


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUE: Organization of Dental Treatment Teams

DISCUSSION: This unit is responsible for area dental support of the soldiers in theater. The current number of soldiers exceeds by at least a factor of 5 the recommended basis of allocation. In addition the distances involved mean the large teams must be broken down into smaller treatment sections. This increases the need for equipment and transportation assets in order to be near our patients. Current design is too large and inflexible. Need smaller more portable teams with portable X-Ray system (hand held) and more transportation assets. MF2K is a partial fix.

RECOMMENDATION: The Dental Detachment of Med Force 2000 will answer this problem to some extent. The one 3 chair clinic and three 1 chair clinics will enable treatment to be provided in various locations in the corps rear area. The 9 chair section of the Dental Company should be organized and equipped to break out into smaller treatment sections. Additional X-Ray machines (hand held, if possible) and additional utility vehicles (1008s) should be included. Seek acceleration of MF2K MTOE. Request additional tentage, transport, and equipment now.

ACTION: Combat Developers, AHS


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUE: Staff Positions

DISCUSSION: A MASH by MTOE is not authorized a S-l or S-3. In a battalion equivalent these positions are critical. In the 5th MASH these positions are filled by the Chief, PAD and Assistant PAD Officer. For Desert Shield, we deployed with a PROFIS PAD Officer as well.

RECOMMENDATION: Include an Adjutant and an Operations Officer in the MASH MTOE

ACTION: Combat Development/AHS


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUES: Vet MTOE for JA and JB Teams

DISCUSSION: Upon arrival in theater the unit received a copy of the new Veterinary MTOE provided by the Academy of Health Sciences. The new t1TOE rectified many of the drug shortages on the older list but did not list any euthanasia solution or broad-spectrum anthelminthics. Both items have been needed many times since we arrived in country but are not available through the federal stock system.

RECOMMENDATION: That adequate quantities of euthanasia solution and broad-spectrum anthelminthics, for both small and large animals, be assigned an NSN and included in the Veterinary MTOE.

ACTION: Combat Development/AHS


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUE: No Computer Authorized Under the Veterinary MTOE

DISCUSSION: The unit MTOE lists no integral unit field computer system. We anticipated maintaining all forms, reports, property books etc., manually by hand writing all entries. However, since arrival in theater we have been required to type reports, actions, prepare overheads, and maintain databases all of-which require a computer. The modern Army unit depends on the computer .for maintaining all correspondence.

RECOMMENDATION:  A JA team, Veterinary Service Small, MTOE should contain a minimum of one field computer. A JB team, Veterinary Service Large, MTOE should contain two complete field computer systems.

ACTION: Combat Development/AHS


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUE: Shortage of Fuel Handling Specialists (77F)

DISCUSSION: Hospitals burn a significant quantity of fuel during normal operations. Storage of significant quantities of fuel is necessary in order to sustain operations for several days. Personnel are not on hand to properly manage, store, handle, and distribute fuel. Health care has been interrupted due to this personnel shortage.

RECOMMENDATION: Authorize and assign properly trained fuel handlers to hospital units.

ACTION: Combat Development/AHS


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUE: Bulk Fuel and Water Storage. 

DISCUSSION: Hospitals require large quantities of fuel and water for daily operations of the facility but are authorized only limited capacity for storage. In a tactical environment,. Hospitals should have the capability to store as a minimum a 3 day of supply for fuel and water.

RECOMMENDATION: TOE’s be changed to authorized bulk storage equipment for 3 days supply of fuel and water.

ACTION: Combat Development/AHS


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUE: Materials Handling Equipment

DISCUSSION: MTOEs have allowed insufficient MHE. Directed toward peacetime utilization and Corps tasking for support. Too much competition for available assets. Severe effect on established hospitals and running MEDSOM.

RECOMMENDA TI ON: MTOE, change Like units submit requirements to LOG for consolidation and resolution. LOG initiates 2028 to HSC/FORSCOM for Plus-Up

ACTION: Combat Development/AHS.


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUE: Required TO&E Strength for MRO

DISCUSSION: Peacetime regulating procedures require more extensive date gathering and transmission than that expected during hostilities. Current automation methods (TAMMIS) are designed for operation during hostilities.

RECOMMENDATION: For “MRO duties in the AOR, three additional 71G MOS personnel (1 E-6, 2 E-4/E-5) should be obtained for the MRO operation. More training-on field operations with PROFIS filler and between ~1RO channel, i.e., JAMRO is needed. System change requests to TAMMIS must be submitted in order for that system to better support a wider variety of operational missions.

ACTION: Combat Development/AHS


MTOE CHANGES

ISSUE: MTO&E Modifications

DISCUSSION: MTO&E not adequate to cover wartime requirements in personnel ( ie., aviation, transportation/movements, etc) and equipment (especially shortage of weapons, ammo, NBC equipment and vehicles).

RECOMMENDATION: Units should prepare and submit MTO&E changes

ACTION: Combat Development/AHS


SECURITY

ISSUE: Medical Units Do Not Have Sufficient Personnel For Security

DISCUSSION: Medical units do not have sufficient personnel, nor sufficient firepower to provide adequately for defense.

RECOMENDATION: Medical units should not be required to operate independently. Medical units should be placed in base clusters.

ACTION: Clusters


SECURITY

ISSUE: Brigade Headquarters Guard Force

DISCUSSION: Brigade Headquarters doe’s not have the enlisted soldier depth to provide its own guard force.

RECOMt1ENDATION: Corps MP support required.

ACTION: Cor