HSHA-E (350)
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: Preliminary Lessons Learned Reports
1. Forwarded for your review are preliminary lessons learned
reports from the 44th Medical Brigade and the 86th
2. Some of the observations in each of these reports are
valid AMEDD lessons learned which should be reviewed, researched, and
disseminated prior to follow-on units being deployed in support of Operation
Desert Shield.
3. Please review both reports and provide the Directorate of
Evaluation and Standardization (DOES) with input on issues you believe should
be addressed as AMEDD lessons learned NLT 26 November 1990.
4. DOES POC is LTC Samuel K. Rock, XO17l/5574. FOR THE
COMMANDANT:
2 Encls A KSON
as
COLONEL, MS
DISTRIBUTION:
HSHA-T
HSHA-C
HSHA-D
HSHA-F
HSHA-P
HSHA-M
HSPE (PROF IS),
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 44th Medical
Brigade (Rear) (Prov)
AFVH-XA-CO
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: Executive
Summary -
1.
2. Issues of concern for the 44th Medical Brigade during
Operation Desert Shield Phase I follow:
A. Echelons above Corps -
* ISSUE: Pregnant Soldiers
DISCUSSION: As part of the Army Contingency Corps, .the 44th
Medical Brigade must be 100 percent deployable when needed. As Phase I began, a
personnel shortage problem arose due, In part, to a number of pregnant soldiers
within the Brigade. Since these soldiers are temporarily non-deployable and
holding valid slots on unit manning rosters, units were not able to utilize 100
percent of their assigned strength for the exercise.
RECOMMENDATION: Submit request to PERSCOM to change
current regulations so as to' allow pregnant soldiers to be
reassigned to non-deploying units (In the event of a national emergency) or
place them on the Temporary Disability Retired List (TDRL) which will enable
the losing unit to submit valid personnel requisitions for soldiers who are
deployable.
* ISSUE: Blood Program Officer
.DISCUSSION: Blood Program
Management is a critical area In the health care
system. Currently, there Is no provision for a trained
position for a Blood Program Officer In the Brigade.
AFVH-XA-CO
SUBJECT: Executive Summary -Desert Shield
RECOMMENDATION: With the criticality of blood Re-supply and
management In the Area of Operations, a request will be made through the Office
of the Surgeon General (OTSG) to FORSCOM to alter the MTOE to allow either a
full time position or a PROFIS position to lend expertise to the Brigade in
blood management.
* ISSUE: Filler System for Enlisted Personnel
DISCUSSION: The Professional Officer Filler System (PROFIS)
has worked very well during Operation Desert Shield. However, there is not a
system in place for providing fillers for critical enlisted MOS shortages In
the event of a deployment. Most medical units are not authorized to carry personnel
levels at the required strength and, therefore, require many fills on an as
needed basis. An enlisted filler system
for critical medical MOS personnel Is needed.
RECOMMENDATION: That the Office of
the Surgeon
General develop an Enlisted Filler System that can meet the
needs of MTOE medical units which do not maintain an ALO 1 level of fill of
personnel.
* ISSUE: PROFIS Training In
Soldier's Skills
DISCUSSION: The vast majority of Incoming PROFIS personnel
have demonstrated a lack of training In basic
soldier's skills that enable them to survive on the modern battlefield.
Training In an NBC environment, weapons qualification
and other areas, Is extremely Important to a soldier when faced with the
possibility of needing these skills, as In Operation Desert Shield.
RECOMMENDATION: That Health Services Command develop a training and maintenance program In Common Task
Skills for designated PROFIS personnel that will better enable them to survive
on the battlefield. Additionally maintenance of these skills must be a
regulatory requirement with the responsibility failing to
* ISSUE: Insufficient Quantities of Weapons and Chemical
Protective Gear.
DISCUSSION: As part of the U.S. Army Contingency Corps, with
the mission of going anywhere at any moment, the 44th Medical Brigade must be In a position to provide personal protection to all of Its
personnel, to Include attached PROFIS, etc. Currently, there is not
authorization to maintain sufficient numbers of weapons and chemical protective
Items at the unit. This fact resulted In significant
logistical problems In the acquisition of enough weapons and CPOG gear during
rapid deployment, as in the case of Operation Desert Shield.
RECOMMENDATION: That Forces Command alter
the MTOE of the 44th Medical Brigade to authorize an Increase In the number of
weapons and chemical gear kept on-hand for contingency missions. This will
eliminate this logistical problem In the event of an emergency, when there may
not be enough time to provide these Items for the soldiers.
* ISSUE: Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) for
Contingency Units
DISCUSSION: Medical units, particularly hospitals, within
the XVIII Airborne Corps should be brought to ALO 1. Currently, all like units
In the Active Army are authorized to be staffed and equipped at sub-ALO 1
levels. With the mission of the Contingency Corps, It Is Imperative that units
with this no- notice, world-wide mission be staffed and equipped at full
strength since there Is not sufficient time
AFVH-XA-CO
SUBJECT: Executive Summary -Desert Shield during a typical
exercise to bring the unit up to required strength before deployment.
RECOMMENDATION: Request the upgrading of Authorized Levels
of Organization for Contingency Corps units to ALO 1.
DISCUSSION: As part of the U.S. Army Contingency Corps, with
the mission of going anywhere at any moment, the 44th Medical Brigade must be In a position to provide personal protection to all of Its
personnel, to Include attached PROFIS, etc. Currently, there is not
authorization to maintain sufficient numbers of weapons and chemical protective
Items at the unit. This fact resulted In significant
logistical problems In the acquisition of enough weapons and CPOG gear during
rapid deployment, as in the case of Operation Desert Shield.
RECOMMENDATION: That Forces Command alter
the MTOE of the 44th Medical Brigade to authorize an Increase In the number of
weapons and chemical gear kept on-hand for contingency missions. This will
eliminate this logistical problem In the event of an emergency, when there may
not be enough time to provide these Items for the soldiers.
* ISSUE: On-Hand Contingency Supplies and Equipment
DISCUSSION: In light of the fact that Stocks of supplies,
uniforms and equipment for Operation Desert Shield have been very difficult to
procure' in adequate sizes and quantities, It would be more beneficial and
efficient to provide contingency stocks of Items such as uniforms, for units
based on their CAPSTONE alignment. Units cold store and maintain these Items at
their home station which would enable the Immediate
issue of necessary items to deploying soldier. The lack of such a program was
evident when first echelon personnel deployed from
RECOMMENDATION: That units be
Issued uniforms and equipment for local storage as would be required for their
contingency under their CAPSTONE alignment.
* ISSUE: PROFIS Fillers Report to the Brigade In Various States of Readiness
DISCUSSION: PROFIS personnel arrived In the Brigade with all
different types of luggage, uniforms, CTA-60, etc. Some had the required
immunizations, some did not, some had orders, others
didn't. There was no consistency in the preparation of the PROFIS personnel.
RECOMMENDATION:
a. That OTSG develop a supplement to the Regulation that
provides MEDDAC/MEDCEN Commanders with checklists or requirements for PROF IS
qualification, POR, equipment, training, etc., and mandates that Commanders
ensure they comply.
b. As PROFIS personnel are identified through normal
channels, Commanders of their deploying unit should write to them and explain
the level of readiness that each must maintain, I.e. POR status, CTA-60, etc.
SUBJECT: Executive Summary -Desert Shield
* ISSUE: USER "C" Rating Does Not Equal
Capabilities
DISCUSSION: The
RECOMMENDATION: A request for an Improvement to the system
must be Initiated at the command level and forwarded
to DA.
B. Corps and Post level Issues
* ISSUE: Cumbersome POR Procedures
DISSCUSSION: POR procedures have continually been a main
obstacle In the deployment process. It is often done piece-
meal with long lines and poor information flow In relation to when, where and
how to do things. A better system must be developed.
AFVH-XA-CO
SUBJECT: Executive Summary -Desert Shield
RECOMMENDATION: Streamline POR procedures by Implementing a
manifest bar code system on color coded cards.
Issued cards would reflect current POR status on a
semi-annual basis. POR processing should be made a part of "One-Stop"
In- processing center.
* ISSUE: Computerizing the POR checklist on a Data Base
DISCUSSION: Much time was spent during the Initial, high
pressure days In gathering information that could have
already been computerized. Utilizing database capable of manipulating figures
would have provided quick, accurate Information. This could be done particularly
in the areas of supply requirements such as BDU sizes, boot sizes, CPOG sizes,
etc. Other Items that could be added are family support group, addresses and
notification rosters, blood types, single parent information, etc.
RECOMMENDATION: Acquire ADP equipment for company
headquarters to use as a means for sourcing this data.
* ISSUE: Lack of Planning for XVIII Airborne
DISCUSSION: While the XVIII Airborne Corps does well , with air movement operations, very little
consideration Is given to sea movement requirements. This lack of emphasis was
evident as sea deployment commenced. There was. no
apparent method of prioritizing loads for the ships. As a result, unit
equipment were split up and Integrity was lost.
Essential pieces of equipment did not arrive In Saudi
Arabia together, which prevented the use of most Items without the mutual
support of the separated pieces.
RECOMMENDATION: Use the same deployment procedures as used
at Green Ramp, I.e., deploy movements team with serial sequencing and load ship
according to unit priorities.
* ISSUE: Rear Detachment Commander Legal Authority
DISCUSSION: At the onset of the exercise there was a Legal
dilemma, In how UCMJ authority could be split between
a Forward Commander and a Rear Commander. Legally, there cannot be two
commanders for the same unit. Evidently, placing the term "Rear"
"Provisional" behind the unit name for the rear detachment allows the
Rear Detachment Commander to exercise UCMJ authority over Rear Detachment
personnel.
AFVH-XA-CO
SUBJECT: Executive Summary -Desert Shield
RECOMMENDATION: Activate the use of the words
"(Rear)"
"(Provisional)" at the end of all unit names so as to allow REAR DET
CO to exercise UCMJ authority. Publish a Corps policy to clarify the Issue.
* ISSUE: Post Support Missions
DISCUSSION: There was no plan for the assumption of Post
Support missions with regard to ground and air ambulance requirements upon the
complete deployment of the Brigade. The 44th Medical Brigade does not have the
assets to provide even command and control of reserve units who are called for
these missions.
RECOMMENDATION: That XVIII Airborne Corps and the Director
of Reserve Components develop a plan for continued post support upon the
deployment of the entire 44th Medical Brigade.
* ISSUE: AVIM Support
DISCUSSION: In the beginning stages of Operation
Desert Shield, there was little guidance on which unit would
provide AVIM support for Brigade air ambulance assets. This lack of information
created some Initial logistical questions, which could have stalled operations.
RECOMMENDATION: That XVIII Airborne Corps provide early
guidance on AVIM support for air assets.
* ISSUE: 1st
was not used as It was designed. At a
minimum, Information pertaining to the 44th Medical Brigade was missing,
erroneous or questionable. The document is several years old. Initial airflow
from COSCOM was not In accordance with any pre-planned RSOP packages.
RECOMMENDATION: That COSCOM update the
* ISSUE: Distribution of Required Personal Gear
DISCUSSION: There was no plan for the distribution of desert
BDUs, chemical protective over-garments, or flak vests. COSCOM left It’s units to fend for themselves on a first-come,
first-served basis. This system Is not efficient.
Units who deployed with the first airlift failed to obtain the necessary Items
because the supply point could not prioritize Its customers, ISSD performed
"fill or kill" operations and failed to reorder zero balance Items
until It was too late for deploying units to get the Items needed,
RECOMMENDATION: That COSCOM draw these Items for the entire
COSCOM and operate a central Issue operation for distribution, based on
priority of flow of units; not first-come, first-served.
* ISSUE: Closure of Direct and
General Support Units
DISCUSSION: There was no coordination between COSCOM and
subordinate units as to schedules for closing direct support and general
support units which service the 44th Medical Brigade. Units only discovered on
the day of the closing that COSCOM DS/GS elements would no longer support them.
There was no Information on where and how to pick items that came In on 0-1 priorities, nor was there Information on how to
continue to order critical supplies and equipment.
RECOMMENDATION: COSCOM establish a
detailed plan for the phasing out of DSU’s and GSU’s and keep subordinate units Informed.
* ISSUE: Upgraded Requisition
Priorities
AFVH-XA-CO
SUBJECT: Executive Summary -Desert Shield
DISCUSSION: COSCOM had published the word that all
outstanding high priority requisitions would be automatically upgraded to 01 by
COSCOM G4 In order to relieve the burden on the units In
changing the requisitions themselves. However, COSCOM G4 did not know that this
was to happen, so It didn't. Units ended up manually
back-feeding requests on the upgraded priority once It
was discovered that the automatic upgrades were not done. This lack of
coordination within COSCOM put units three to four days behind In the requisition process. .
RECOMMENDATION: That COSCOM staff communicate among
themselves. That units Initiate the upgrade of requisitions themselves.
* ISSUE: Vehicle Maintenance Contact
Teams
DISCUSSION: Most mechanics' tool boxes and shop tools were
packed early on In the plan to move to the sea port.
This packing left very limited repair capabilities In
the rear to sup- port equipment going later, or by air.
RECOMMENDATION: That COSCOM develop a mobile maintenance
contact team to conduct last minute repairs on vehicles after the unit
maintenance capability has deployed.
* ISSUE: Aviation Repair Parts System
DISCUSSION: The aviation repair parts system operates at a
high level of Intensity on a dally basis. This made It
difficult to relate the Increased need for parts for the 67th Med Det. prior to
deployment. All required parts were not received,
to Include a controlled substitution
of other units' aircraft until C+16.
RECOMMENDATION: Aviation PLL must be Increased and
capability to carry PLL Increased. Also, the ability for the 67th Med Det to
stock AIMI parts as part of the aviation PLL Is essential.
D. Brigade Level Issues-
* ISSUE: PROFIS Billeting and Transportation
DISCUSSION: As more and more PROFIS personnel arrived In the Brigade, we discovered that there was no plan
to accept them with consolidated billeting and transportation. PROFIS were
spread allover
RECOMMENDATION: Amend the Brigade RSOP to require the
arrangement of billeting and transportation for all known Incoming PROFIS
personnel. Planning can avoid some costly arrangements such as single rooms and
single rental cars.
* ISSUE: POR Improvements
DISCUSSION: Preparation for Overseas Movement (POR) was
disjointed, cumbersome and lacked planning, which resulted In
long lines and 24-hour operations. With proper maintenance of soldiers' POR
status, these problems could be minimized.
AFVH-XA-CO
SUBJECT: Executive Summary -Desert Shield
RECOMMENDATION: That the Brigade develop
a POR checklist and packet to be used for each Soldier In the command. In sure subordinate units follow through with Implementation.
* ISSUE: Brigade RSOP
SUBJECT: Executive Summary -Desert Shield DISCUSSION: The
Brigade did not initiate either the X-Hour sequence nor
the N-Hour sequence during the entire exercise. Due to the failure to follow
established plans, there were no Initial plans for par, POV parking, tasking
relief, schools,
RECOMMENDATION: Update the Brigade RSOP and use It.
* ISSUE: 19t COSCOM Crisis Action Planning System
(
DISCUSSION: The 1st COSCOM
RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that changes are made In the COSCOM
* ISSUE: CORPS "D" Packages
DISCUSSION: Some of the Brigade units do not have accurate
configurations for the I r Corp9 "0" packages In relation to " fitting on the plane."
RECOMMENDATION: That units review and update their Corps ,. D" packages.
* ISSUE: Establish a Brigade Priority List
DISCUSSION:
There was no apparent priority of load-out for Brigade units when the
"100% Load-Out" directive was given. Every unit demanded limited
resources, personnel, and time simultaneously.
RECOMMENDATION: The Brigade Staff
should develop a Priority Action List (PAL) for the Commander's approval. The PAL
would then govern the activities of supporting staff and unit activities to
ensure that the Initial support went where It was
deemed most necessary by the Brigade Commander.
* ISSUE: Early Deploying Advance Party (ADVON)
DISCUSSION:
As units prepare to move to new locations, a well-informed, well-maintained
ADVON with complete knowledge of its respective unit’s requirements for real
estate, utilities (Including water and waste disposal), as well as other
matters of Interest, Is vital to the smooth operation of unit movement.
Additionally, this ADVON should be capable of assuming command of follow-on
echelons of the unit until the normal command Is
established. The ADVON should be a routine additional duty.
RECOMMENDATION: That each unit select
and train ADVON parties that are capable of manipulating all aspects of the
unit's requirements prior to unit arrival In an area of operations. ADVON party
should train regularly to maintain necessary skills so that: there is little
need for final training prior to actual deployment. ADVON must be completely
self-supporting.
AFVH-XA-CO
SUBJECT: Executive Summary -Desert Shield
* ISSUE: Female Specific Items
DISCUSSION: There are few plans for providing Items
essential to female soldiers. This Includes birth control,
feminine hygiene products, protective masks (smaller sizes), and uniforms.
RECOMMENDATION: Identify and stock
required Items.
* ISSUE: Maintenance Shortfalls and
Spare Parts
DISCUSSION: When the mission was given to load-up, critical
equipment was Identified as needing Immediate repair,
some which were prime movers. We were given no priority In Support Maintenance
facilities, no-where certain spare parts available for Organizational
Maintenance activities. This resulted In dragging some
non-operational equipment to port.
RECOMMENDATION:
a. Obtain local purchase authority to buy spare parts from
the economy If they are not available In the system.
b. Obtain a COSCOM Directive that allows an Integration of
prioritized vehicles by MSC (each MSC sends Its
top priority vehicle).
c. Establish a system whereby Installations without
deploying units can be queried for available parts.
* ISSUE: Storage of Basic Load of Class V In Unit Arms Rooms.
DISCUSSION: When deploying In
echelons, a unit's class V Issue cannot be broken down at the ASP Into
Individual basic load Increments.
RECOMMENDATION: The unit must draw Its
entire basic load and then Issue It to Individuals. This ammo should be stored
In the Arms Room and given out as required.
* ISSUE: Lack of Automation/Information Management Equipment
within the Brigade
DISCUSSION: State of the art capabilities are required to
execute routine and contingency operational missions. This
capability Includes
RECOMMENDATION: Brigade MUST acquire
modern means of communication.
* ISSUE: USAMMA Support
DISCUSSION: USAMMA requests were
being filled on day two. This was outstanding support.
RECOMMENDATION: Command USAMMA.
* ISSUE: Families are demanding frequent and timely
Information on their loved-ones forward-deployed.
DISCUSSION: As events unfold and are reported by the news
media, families experience a heightened level of concern and demand more
Information. Such a demand places an unrealistic burden on the skeletal rear
detachment. However, this does not relieve the command from taking care of Its own.
RECOMMENDATION: That Brigade Headquarters obtain a recording
telephone. This "hot line" will be operational 24 hours per day. The
REAR DET CO will update the message daily, providing all the Information
possible without violating security precautions.
* ISSUE: Rear Detachment Plan
DISCUSSION: A workable plan for the functioning Rear Detachment
was devised after the exercise began. The first step was to Identify all Non-Deployable's and to designate a REAR DET Commander to
assume command and control of all Brigade assets in the rear area. The
REARDETCO assumes the responsibilities of: SDO/SDNCO duties, Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) duties, accountability and safeguarding of all brigade
property left behind (buildings, installation property, furnishings, etc.), all
brigade staff functions, In-processing and deploying replacements, Brigade
Family Support Group representative, and UCMJ actions
for rear personnel. Only one officer was designated for the REARDET. All
functions performed In the rear will be accomplished
by the non-deploying personnel.
RECOMMENDATION: It Is too early to
tell what the actual responsibilities for the REARDET will be, until all
deploying parties are gone. So far, during Phase I, the plan seems to be
adequate. Changes may be made to leave one physically capable and responsible
NCO behind from each Battalion size element to assume responsibility for that
unit, in order to assist the REARDETCO.
FOR THE
G.S.
MS Chief of Staff
DISTRIBUTION:
Health Services Command (1)
Cdr, COSCOM (1)
Corps G-3 (1)
Corps Surgeon (1)
Office of the Surgeon General (1)
Health Care Operations Div (1)
Bde Cdr (1)
MEMORANDUM FOR LTC
SUBJECT: Desert Shield Lessons Learned
1. As promised, lessons learned so far. This by no means is
an all inclusive list and I have my staff putting together other items that
they encountered.
2. I am convinced that many of my frustrations were as a
result of the post on which the unit happens to be located. I can't begin to
explain what it is like being on an installation where the deployment for most
is a spectator sport and they are more concerned with having briefing chart
right than getting the job done. Of course everyone wants the able to put
something about Desert Shield on the OER Support Form so there is lots of
"help". Oh well, I guess that's why commanders get the big bucks.
3. As we move to other places and continue to learn more
things, I will send more. It isn't often you get to participate in an Army wide
ARTEP.
LTC, MSC
Commanding
ISSUE: MOBILITY OF DEPMEDS-MILVANS
DISCUSSION: The number of MILVANS on the
TOE do not adequately meet the needs of the unit too deploy all 400 beds
of an evacuation hospital. This is especially true if the unit will be shipped
by sea (the most likely scenario). Functional packing, coupled with the amount
of equipment required dictates that additional MILVANS be obtained. In our
particular case, we went from 29 to 45 to move the unit by sea. These 45 did
not hold all unit equipment and some items still were required to go
palletized.
RECOMMENDATION: The TOE of DEPMEDS facilities be modified to insure that there are sufficient MILVANS on
the TOE to allow the unit to go square.
ISSUE: MOBILITY OF DEPMEDS-MILVANS
DISCUSSION: The Army MILVAN has different dimensions than
the international standard for MILVANS. Army MILVANS are 8x8x20 while the
RECOMMENDATION: R&D Command should explore the
possibility of developing an adaptor so that dolly sets can be attached to and
used with the current industry standard MILVAN.
ISSUE: MOVEMENT OF UNIT BY SEA
DISCUSSION: The current system allows no input from the unit
commander to the port commander with regard to mission critical items to be
loaded with the majority of the units equipment. In
our case, the majority of the equipment was loaded onto one ship.
However, all of the ECUs, the
power cables, and the Power Distribution Boxes were left. This created a
situation where we then had to go to FORSCOM to obtain airflow to insure that
the hospital could be made operational at the other end in a timely manner.
RECOMMENDATION: Change the authorization of MILVANS on the
TOE to allow for splitting of these critical assets between several MILVANS to
insure some capability gets loaded.
ISSUE: MOVEMENT OF UNIT BY SEA
DISCUSSION: Our port and the personnel operating the port
did not provide us any type documentation acknowledging that they received the
type equipment which we said they did. While you have the
ship manifest, there is no document for
property accountability which shows that indeed, a unit took everything to port
that they said they did.
RECOMMENDATION: Something as simple as a stamped copy of the
load plan, acknowledging receipt by the Terminal Transfer unit at the port
would keep the property accountability of major items of equipment intact.
ISSUE: MOVEMENT OF DEPMEDS
DISCUSSION: A total of 49 commercial flatbeds were required
to move this unit to port. Given the early deployment of most of the Army
transportation assets, this will be the requirement in the future. Commanders
and installation transportation officers must plan for this in the future.
RECOMMENDATION: Commanders of DEPMEDS equipped must
coordinate with the ITO to insure that they have an appreciation of how much
"stuff" there is with the package.
ISSUE: AUEL
DISCUSSION: At the onset of the deployment the units AUEL
was totally inadequate. It was used as the planning document by the ITO and the
transportation requirements were grossly understated. This document should be a
"living" document but because of its critical nature and the uses of
it, it should be locked in as early as possible.
RECOMMENDATION: Insure that the units AUEL is reviewed at
least quarterly and up dated as new major pieces of equipment are added.
ISSUE:
DISCUSSION: The availability of trained movements
personnel is critical in the Corps level units. Without a Division
Transportation Officer to consult you are forced to rely on the installation
movements personnel. In my case that is one civilian and one SP4. While both of
these personnel performed admirably, they were quickly overwhelmed when
confronted with moving more than one unit moving to the port at the same time.
RECOMMENDATION:
a. AHS in conjunction with the
b. Actively encourage AMEDD personnel to attend the unit
movements courses offered at
ISSUE: PROFIS
DISCUSSION: Who is in charge. As
the FORSCOM commander calling for my PROFIS I have had to deal with issues like
funding of the TDY, changes to the roster at the 11th hour, substitutions made
by consultants without informing the personnel community at
RECOMMENDATION:
a. The current regulation is entirely to general. AR 601-142
must be expanded to detail all of the responsibilities with regard to PROFIS.
It should be a "cookbook" that all concerned can go to for guidance.
Current guidance is supplemented in a number of MACOM level regulations. It
should be clearly outlined who funds what with regards to travel, Per Diem etc.
A timeline should be developed to determine when the appropriate time to call
for PROFIS.
b. There must be a time when the PROFIS roster is frozen and
no changes are permitted without approval above the action officer level.
c. Hopefully, now that it has happened, in the future, the
PROFIS roster and who is put on it will be taken more seriously by the action
people within
d. All levels of command in
ISSUE: POR STATUS OF PROFIS
DISCUSSION: The POR status of most PROFIS personnel
reporting to this unit was dismal at best. Each sending unit had a different
way of sending information and sent different degrees of information, despite
being informed what was required when the PROFIS was called up. This created
additional problems for us in terms of lining up the post agencies at
RECOMMENDATION: A standard packet must be developed within
AR 601-142 which clearly spells out what needs to be brought to the gaining
unit, what type records should be left etc. Right now it seems to be what ever
the
ISSUE: PROFIS ENTITLEMENTS
DISCUSSION: Most losing units did not deal with issues like
storage of household goods for single PROF IS personnel. Most were not made
aware by their losing unit that they were entitled to. store
their household goods at government expense. Once the PROFIS arrived, many
hours were spent by the unit staff and the installation transportation trying
to sort this out for them.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Losing units must insure that they are
proactive with regard to PROFIS personnel being deployable totally.
ISSUE: Cut off of Supplies-All classes
DISCUSSION: At the onset of Desert Shield, all unit
shortages were ordered on an 0-2 priority. This
resulted in most of the unit shortages filled. However, once a unit has been
shipped by sea, as we were, the supplies keep coming with no way to ship them,
no way to pick them up etc. Coordination must be made early on to establish a
cut off date when the unit will no longer accept supplies and the
RECOMMENDATION: That Commanders
coordinate early on to establish a cut off date with all supply support
agencies regarding all outstanding requisitions. Unit document registers should
be purged and all garrison type equipment cancelled to insure non mission items
are not shipped to the AOR.
ISSUE: Chopping of Units to their Medical Headquarters
DISCUSSION: Medical units which are located on different
installations than their next higher headquarters for deployment need to be
chopped to them early in the deployment sequence. Many of the actions which
were requested by 44th Med Bde or the 1st Med
RECOMMENDATION: Establish the trace early on, announce it
and chop the units to that trace for all issues concerning the deployment.
ISSUE: Pregnancy
DISCUSSION: Many female soldiers have become pregnant since
the announcement of the deployment. Some of these soldiers have blatantly
stated they did it to become non deployable.
RECOMMENDATION: Changes to the appropriate regulations
should be made so that female soldiers loose the option to remain on active
duty if they are identified as pregnant once the unit has been alerted for
deployment. Continuing to allow non-deployable soldiers to remain on active
duty once a deployment situation arises at the same time the Army is being
downsized is wrong. There is no special consideration given to the soldier
whose wife is pregnant and these soldiers should not be given this out.
ISSUE: NON DEPLOYABILITY OF SOLDIERS
DISCUSSION: Many of the non deployable soldiers of this unit
were made so based on profiles issued by the local MEDDAC. For the most part
these profiles were issued once the deployment was announced. There seems to be
no concern at the higher levels as to the ramifications of the profile upon the
deploying unit. Elective surgeries must be stopped if the resulting profile
will make the soldier non deployable. This is no way indicates that soldiers should
be denied required medical treatment.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
ISSUES: Command and Control
DISCUSSION: Currently my higher headquarters is a
RECOMMENDATION: FORSCOM should take a proactive role to
insure, through an MOU with TRADOC, that FORSCOM units on non-FORSCOM
installations belong to the garrison commander so that they each work for the
same boss and issues involving the deployment are not filtered through people
who are viewing the deployment as a spectator sport.
ISSUES: Outpatient Treatment
DISCUSSTON: An implied mission for any medical treatment
facility is that of area medical support. It has been the experience of the
unit on other exercises that outpatient treatment occupies much of the patient
care hours spent. There is no provisions within the
TOE to allow space for this activity. The unit is then left with two
alternatives 1) run sick call etc out of the
RECOMMENDATION: That the TOE be expanded to add an
additional 8 section temper tent with two vestibules to accommodate an out
patient clinic. While there are certainly other units with in the TOE structure,
which have this mission, the addition of this equipment would increase the
overall flexibility of corp level units.
ISSUE: ENLISTED FILLERS
DISCUSSION: Current the need for enlisted fillers is based
on the overall C rating of the unit. Once a unit meets ALO there is no solid
mechanism to identify continued critical enlisted fillers.
I my case I am excess some support type personnel and short
in 91C and 91D. This presents a distorted picture of mission capability of the
unit.
RECOMMENDATION: That DA identify specific MOS which are
managed
By exception in terms of filler
personnel. In my
particular case I would like to see 91C and 91D be
required to be filled to at least 100%. These are the bread and butter MOS of
an evacuation hospital. All other shortages can be overcome.
ISSUE: Assignment of PROFIS Chief Nurse
DISCUSSION: Currently, the
RECOMMENDATION: One of two options should be implemented;
either the